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This  paper  analyzes  the  effects  of  a  ban  on  smoking  in  public  places  upon  firms  and 
consumers. Analysis of survey data from public houses finds that the Scottish smoking ban 
(introduced  in  March  2006)  reduced  pub  sales  and  harmed  medium  run  profitability.  An 
event study analysis of the stock market performance of pub-holding companies corroborates 
the negative effects of the smoking ban on firm performance.  We develop a model of public 
good  provision  by  firms  to  offer  an  interpretation  of  these  findings.  In  the  context  of 
smoking,  the  public  good  aspect  and  consumer  heterogeneity  in  preferences  regarding 
smoking appear to be central to the problem. The model allows us to examine the appropriate 
form of optimal regulation and to study the welfare effect of a smoking ban. The optimal 
policy response ensures that some pubs be permitted to allow smoking while others are not. 
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1. Introduction 
This  paper  considers  empirical  and  theoretical  evidence  on  a  form  of  market 
regulation that has come to widespread prominence in recent years, namely smoking bans. 
There are two main reasons why governments may consider the introduction of smoking 
bans. The first is to reduce the incidence of smoking by reducing the set of places where new, 
current  and  quitting  smokers  can  light  up.  The  second  relates  to  the  externality  issue  of 
second hand smoking and it lies at the heart of most smoking bans. 
The  externality  argument  in  favor  of  bans  for  places  such  as  airports  is 
straightforward. Smokers impose a negative externality that, without avoiding the use of the 
services provided by the airport, non-smokers (either users or employees) are unable to avoid. 
In other sectors - like public houses in the hospitality sector we study - if the population is 
well  informed  about  the  consequences  of  second  hand-smoking,  the  case  for  a  blanket 
smoking ban seems less obvious. For pubs and bars, there are large varieties that one may 
patronize, and these are owned and operated by private profit maximizing individuals. Since 
customers (employees) are free to patronize (work) or not any such bar, and since bars are 
free to compete for customers (employees) via their choice of smoking policies, an absolutist 
case for a ban is in principle less compelling. The effect of bans on the incidence of smoking 
is not straightforward.  For instance, Adda and Cornaglia (2010) do not find evidence that 
smoking bans have an effect on the prevalence of smoking nor quits, exploiting data across 
US states and time. Using biomarkers of nicotine, they do not find any effects of smoking 
bans on non-smokers and find evidence of a displacement of smokers from bars to private 
places.   2
These issues raise a number of related questions that this paper is set to study. First, 
what are the economic effects of banning smoking in the hospitality industry? Second, what 
are the welfare consequences of a blanket smoking ban? Are there suitable alternatives that 
may raise welfare?  
The public house sector is an important part of the UK economy. There were 93,000 
licensed premises in the UK in 2004, and this number has been growing over a decade. In 
that year, the total UK public houses market was worth 15.25 billion pounds or 1.4% of GDP.  
Moreover, the pub culture is an important aspect of socializing in the UK, where 80% of 
adults defines them-selves as pub goers and 15 million people drink in a pub at least once a 
week (British Beer and Pub Association web site). 
The paper starts by using survey data to analyze the economic effect on pubs of the 
smoking  ban  introduced  in  Scotland  in  March  2006.  Our  empirical  strategy  relies  in 
comparing outcomes in Scotland before and after the ban versus those in Northern England 
where such a ban was not in place.  We find that the comprehensive ban on smoking in 
Scottish public houses resulted in sales falling by about 10% relative to English pubs across 
the border. On the other hand, prices were largely unresponsive. There was also a fall in 
profitability  ranging  from  2  to  4%  in  the  medium  run.  The  fall  in  profitability  is  also 
corroborated  by  using  stock  market  performance  data  where  we  find  significant 
announcement effects of the ban upon the share price of pub holding companies.  
We  also  develop  a  model  of  public  good  provision  by  firms.  In  the  context  of 
smoking,  the  public  good  aspect  and  consumer  heterogeneity  in  preferences  regarding 
smoking appear to be central to the problem. Our model allows us to examine the appropriate 
form of optimal regulation and to study the welfare effect of a smoking ban. In particular, we   3
examine  whether  a  ban  on  smoking  in  pubs  can  be  welfare  improving,  or  some  other 
regulation might be appropriate. The optimal policy response is to ensure that some pubs be 
permitted  to  allow  smoking  while  others  are  not.  In  the  real  world,  this  could  be 
operationalized, for example, via a licensing policy.  
Our  paper  advances  the  literature  in  several  directions.  Whilst  previous  empirical 
research  on  smoking  bans  has  examined  the  effects  on  firm  performance
1,  some  of  this 
exploits only cross-sectional variation or time-series variation in policy (see, for instance, 
Alamar and Glantz, 2004, or Cowling and Bond, 2005). Our study improves upon this by 
carrying out a before-after analysis methodology using English pubs located just south of the 
Scottish border as a control group (with many pubs appearing in both waves of the survey), 
thereby  facilitating  a  proper  difference-in-difference  approach,  which  is  able  to  eliminate 
both time and regional confounders.  
Another strand of the empirical literature exploits local changes in smoking regulation 
at county or city level in the United States (see Sciacca and Ratliff, 1998, Bartosch and Pope, 
1999, 2002, Hyland et al, 2000 and Adams and Cotti, 2007).
2 In contrast, the empirical part 
of our study exploits the advent of a total ban across an entire region. One can argue that the 
implementation of smoking bans at city level is not an exogenous event, as the hospitality 
industry is likely to have local political power to influence such a policy. Finally, and in an 
exercise only recently considered in the literature (see Tomlin (2009)), we corroborate and 
extend our micro-data results by using data on share values of pub holding companies using 
                                                 
1 See for instance the references in the survey by Scollo et al (2003). 
2 One notable exception is who investigate the effect of smoking bans across American states and time on 
employment in bars and restaurants.    4
an event study analysis of announcements of the introduction and implementation of smoking 
bans in the UK.  
On the theoretical side, while there is an extensive literature on the market provision 
of quality when consumers differ in their valuations of quality
3, there is little work examining 
this in a context where quality is a public good, and in a situation where all customers of the 
firm are constrained to consume the same quality level. An exception is the literature on the 
market provision of broadcasting where Anderson and Coate (2005) consider the question of 
whether  there  is  excessive  or  too  little  advertising,  while  Armstrong  (2005)  also  allows 
program quality to be a choice variable. However, these papers assume that all consumers 
have identical evaluations of advertisements and quality. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  briefly  describes  the 
institutional setting, including the widespread introduction of smoking bans in public places, 
and then focuses on the particular ban on which our empirical analysis is based.  Section 3 
presents empirical evidence on the impact of smoking bans on firm performance, first looking 
at the effects on sales, prices and profitability, then reporting the outcome from the stock 
market valuation event study. Section 4 sets out a theoretical model where a smoking ban is 
introduced in the context of competition between pubs. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Setting 
International Picture 
Smoking bans have been introduced in a number of countries across the globe. The 
nature and extent of these bans, as of 2008, are shown in Figure 1. The Figure makes it clear 
                                                 
3 Recent contributions include Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002).   5
that  the  vast  majority  of  bans  were  introduced  in  the  five  years  up  to  2008.  The 
heterogeneous nature of bans is also evident from the Figure.  For example several countries, 
and some American states (or counties), have introduced total bans in bars and restaurants, 
while  other  countries  have  opted  for  partial  bans  or  smoking  designated  areas.  About  a 
quarter  of  the  world  population  now  live  under  bans  that  prevent  smoking  in  bars  and 
restaurants, although there is heterogeneity in how these bans are enforced.  
The Scottish Smoking Ban 
Most of the empirical analysis reported in this paper focuses upon the introduction of 
the Scottish smoking ban of 2006 and evaluates its impact upon pub economic performance.  
Identification  of  an  effect  of  bans  comes  from  an  empirical  analysis  of  performance  of 
Scottish pubs before and after ban introduction relative to what happened in English pubs at 
the same time (where no ban was in place).
4  
The historical context of the Scottish ban, and the fact that Scotland could introduce a 
ban  when  other  parts  of  the  UK  did  not,  came  about  because  of  devolution  of  decision 
making across the nations of the UK. The formation of the Scottish Parliament and Executive 
to  administer  Scottish  affairs  in  1999  allowed  Scotland  to  create  anti-tobacco  legislation 
independently of the rest of the UK.  
Before 2004 the Scottish Executive view was that legislation to ban smoking in bars 
and restaurants was a last resort. In 2000, the hospitality industry had signed up a Scottish 
Executive charter designed to encourage smoke-free policies, including better ventilation and 
prominently  displayed  official  stickers  outlining  the  establishment’s  smoking  policy.  The 
                                                 
4 For a more detailed history of the Scottish and English smoking bans we refer the reader to the Appendix 1 of 
the paper.    6
idea was to rely on the voluntary approach as much as possible. However, on March 26 2006 
Scotland became the first region of the United Kingdom to ban smoking in public places, 
following a vote that took place a year earlier. England also introduced a smoking ban in all 
restaurants and pubs on July 1 2007, again following much debate and controversy.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
Our empirical  analysis  draws on two sources of evidence. First, based upon the Scottish 
smoking ban, we use micro data on sales, prices and profitability of pubs that was collected 
for this study. Second, we use time-series evidence on share prices of companies affected by 
the bans in Scotland and England to investigate the long-term effects on pub performance. 
3.1. Differences-in-differences estimates with survey data 
Data Collection – The Scottish Smoking Ban 
We collected data on public houses in Scotland before and after ban introduction and, 
to define a control group of pubs unaffected by the ban, in Northern England (Cleveland, 
County Durham, Cumbria, North Yorkshire, Northumberland and Tyne and Wear)
5. Figure 2 
presents a map of Great Britain with the treatment and control areas. This was done both 
from  phone  and  postal  surveys.    In  July  2005  we  obtained  a  list  of  public  houses  from 
Experian,  a  company  that  compiles  a  comprehensive  and  up  to  date  database  of 
establishments. For each country, we divided the list in 8 random samples further stratified by 
                                                 
5 There is little scope for substitution across the border in our sample as these are broad geographical areas.   7
the number of employees in the site.
6 In September 2005 we started mailing questionnaires 
the first Monday of every month for eight months.
7   
On  average,  the  survey  took  about  15  minutes  to  complete  and  respondents  were 
provided with a pre-paid envelope to return their answers. In the first wave, we posted 2608 
questionnaires to pubs in England and 3146 questionnaires to pubs in Scotland. In July 2006, 
we obtained an updated sample and on September 2006 we started mailing a new set of 
questionnaires (2500 to England and 3071 to Scotland). Establishments that were in the initial 
sample were contacted in the same month than in the first wave and the new establishments 
in the sample were allocated to 8 random groups as in the previous wave. 
The  postal  survey  was  well  suited  to  capture  the  medium  run  effects  of  the  ban. 
However, we were concerned about the representativeness of the sample when looking at the 
short run effect of the ban, as we have fewer observations shortly before and after the ban. 
Therefore, we also decided to carry out a 10 minutes telephone survey in the period just 
before and after the ban came into place. Establishments were contacted before the ban in the 
weeks from February 24 to March 10 and data was collected again for a second wave, after 
the ban was imposed in Scotland, from May 3 to May 31. Ipsos MORI, a company that 
specializes in opinion polls and market survey data, did the survey for us. The interviews 
were obtained from a similar, but updated, sampling frame used for the postal survey. The 
sampling relied on quotas based on location (rural versus urban) and on size (number of 
employees before the imposition of the ban) in order to be representative of the universe of 
pubs in Scotland and Northern England. Within theses quotas, the pubs were selected at 
                                                 
6 This information was provided with the list of public houses. 
7 The last set of questionnaires was mailed on April 2006 but all the questions refer to economic activity on the 
previous month.   8
random until the desired sample sizes were achieved. In the second wave, an effort was made 
to re-contact the establishments who responded in the first wave. 
The questionnaires in both surveys were designed to obtain general information about 
the  establishment  (for  example:  ownership  status,  establishment  capacity,  availability  of 
outdoor space) and business outcomes such as sales, profit margins, and the price of beer.
8 
Given the different sampling methods and that there were differences in the design of the 
questionnaire we decided to analyze both surveys separately. We interpret the evidence from 
the phone survey as informing the short run and the evidence from the postal survey as 
picking up a medium run effect. 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for both samples of public houses. The samples are 
labelled respectively  as  ‘Short Run / Phone Survey’ and ‘Medium Run / Postal Survey’. 
Columns (1) to (4) of the Table refer to the phone survey, where we obtained a total of 1134 
interviews in England and 1590 in Scotland. In our sample frame of Scottish (English) pubs, 
22% (31%) employ 0 to 3 individuals, 44% (35%) employ 4 to 9 individuals, and 33% (34%) 
employ  more  than  10  individuals.  Because  of  the  sampling  methodology  the  sample  is 
representative of the population of pubs in Scotland and Northern England. Columns (5) to 
(8) refer to the postal survey.  In this case we obtained 528 replies in England and 728 in 
Scotland, corresponding to a response rate of around 11 percent. Comparing with the phone 
survey, which is representative of our sampling population, the sample from the postal survey 
tends  to  under  represent  pubs  that  employ  more  than  10  people.  In  addition,  the  sample 
                                                 
8 The questionnaires are available from the authors on request.   9
obtained in the postal survey after the ban has a larger share of bigger pubs than the before 
sample both in England and Scotland
9.  
In both surveys we asked the question ‘What is the maximum number of customers 
that this establishment can accommodate at any given time?’  Responses to this question 
reveal pubs in England to be larger in size/capacity than in Scotland. According to the phone 
survey, they accommodate on average a maximum of 202 people in England and 166 in 
Scotland.  We  find  that  in  both  England  and  Scotland  the  maximum  capacity  of  the 
establishments in the postal survey is on average smaller than in the phone survey, reflecting 
the under-representation of the bigger pubs in the former. Also, in the postal survey, there is a 
statistically significant difference of 20 people comparing England and Scotland before and 
after the ban. In principle, this can be a behavioral response to the smoking ban.  However, 
we find no change in reported employment size between the sampling frames used to mail the 
questionnaires before and after the ban, which makes it unlikely that the capacity of the pubs 
could have changed in England with respect to Scotland over this period of time. In the 
empirical section, we present results that control for these differences by conditioning on 
establishment capacity and we also focus on set of pubs that appear before and after the ban. 
We return to these points when we discuss our empirical specification. 
We asked in both surveys whether smoking was allowed in the establishment before 
the ban both in Northern England and Scotland and only in Northern England after the ban. It 
                                                 
9However, the shares in the different employment categories do not change significantly between the two 
sampling frames.   10
is remarkable that there is practically no differentiation in terms of this factor–almost all pubs 
allow smoking- before the ban.
10  
In the phone survey we asked: “Can you please tell me your total turnover over the 
course of the last week, that is, over the course of the last seven days and nights?”  In the 
short run, we find that on average sales are slightly bigger in Scotland than in England. 
Comparing the sales before and after the ban there is a growth in sales in Scotland. A naïve 
commentator could assign this to the smoking ban but one should bear in mind that the first 
wave is collected in the winter and the second in the spring. In fact, sales in England grow as 
well and actually faster than in Scotland
11.  
In the postal survey we asked separate questions for the sales of alcohol and food: “In 
the past calendar month, what was your monthly turnover for the sale of alcoholic drinks 
(beer, wine, alcopop, etc)?” and “In the past calendar month, what was your monthly turnover 
for the sale of food, soft drinks, coffee/tea and packet snacks (crisps, etc)?” In columns (5)-
(8) we present the sum of these two answers divided by 4.25 in order to ensure comparability 
with the phone survey answers.
12 Sales fall in Scotland from an average of 5544 pounds 
before the ban to 4893 pounds and in the English sample they increase from 4304 pounds to 
5263 pounds. The trends in sales are similar if we focus only on the sales of alcoholic drinks.  
                                                 
10 After the ban, Scottish pubs could not allow smoking and the proportion of public houses that allow smoking 
in England was between 92 and 95 percent. 
11 A possible concern with the use of survey data is that pub owners may be biased towards reporting negative 
results. Although, this notion can never be completely ruled out, our survey design attempted to minimize this 
possibility by collecting data before and after the survey rather than relying in retrospective data post-
introduction of the ban. An alternative would be to relay on VAT data but as many firms report information on a 
consolidated fashion for all their pubs in the UK this is not feasible. 
12  Measurement  error  generated  in  the  dividing  by  4.25  is  not  of  any  practical  concern  as  we  model  the 
logarithm of sales in our empirical analysis.   11
Apart from pub sales another interesting outcome is prices.  In a practical sense whilst 
pub landlords can use a number of instruments to attract customers and increase revenue, it is 
the price of beer that is the most salient. We asked our interviewees in the postal survey: “In 
the past calendar month, which was the price of a pint of your best selling beer?”
13 According 
to the responses, as shown in Table 1, the price of a pint of beer is between 4 and 10 pence 
higher in Scotland than in England and interestingly with prices increasing over time before 
and after the introduction of the Scottish ban in both England and Scotland. 
Empirical Strategy 
We study the effect of banning smoking in public places on public house sales and 
prices in pubs in Scotland before and after the ban was introduced relative to establishments 
across the English border where no ban was imposed during the period of our study. For this 
purpose, we use the observational data on public houses that we collected before and after the 
imposition of the ban through postal and phone surveys. 
The objective of the statistical analysis is to estimate the causal effect of the smoking 
ban  on  sales  and  prices  of  public  houses.  For  this  purpose  we  rely  on  a  differences-in-
differences strategy where we estimate the following model: 
pct ct t c pct Y = α + β[AfterXScotland] + λAfter + δScotland + ε    
where Ypct is the economic outcome of interest (in the initial analysis the Logarithm of sales 
or the Logarithm of the price of beer) for pub p in country c at time t, “After” is a dummy 
variable defining the period after the ban, “Scotland” is a dummy variable for whether the 
establishment is located in Scotland, and ε is an error term. An ordinary least squares estimate 
                                                 
13 The question in the phone survey was: “What is the current price of your best selling beer or lager?”   12
of β is the average difference in the before-after ban imposition outcome for treated pubs 
(those in Scotland) relative to control pubs (those in England).  
Under certain conditions the differences-in-differences estimator identifies the causal 
parameter of interest. It requires that pre-ban trends in outcomes are similar between Scotland 
and Northern England and that there are no systematic differences between the sample of 
public houses obtained before and after the ban. As we report in Table 1, there are some 
systematic differences on the capacity of the pubs within regions over time for the postal 
survey / medium run sample. In principle, this can be a behavioral response to the smoking 
ban but the similarity in the number of employees per pub reported in the sampling frames 
before and after the ban requires some caution with this interpretation.  
Therefore, we extend the basic differences-in-differences specification by including a 
set  of  county  fixed  effects  (between  39  and  43  depending  on  the  outcome)  and  by 
conditioning both on the logarithm of the capacity of the pub and its interaction with the 
“After” dummy. Of course, it is also possible that there might be other fixed characteristics 
(unobserved for the econometrician) which we omit in this analysis and that might bias our 
estimates so we also look at the smaller sample of pubs that appear in both waves. Finally, we 
use the postal survey sample to look at the plausibility of common trends assumption with a 
placebo experiment. In all our regression analysis, we report standard errors clustered at the 
county level
14 (between 39 and 43 clusters depending on the outcome). 
 
 
                                                 
14  The  standard  errors  assume  independence  across  pubs  within  Scotland  and  Northern  England.  Common 
shocks within country may contribute to overstate the precision of our estimates. There is, unfortunately no fix 
to this problem.    13
Sales and Prices – Baseline Results 
In  Table  2,  we  present  differences-in-differences  estimates  of  the  effect  of  the 
smoking ban on sales and prices. Columns (1) to (4) refer to the short run effect estimated 
from the phone survey
15 and columns (5) to (8) refer to medium run effect estimated from the 
postal  survey.  In  the  first  column,  we  show  estimates  from  the  basic  differences-in-
differences model where we condition on the “After” dummy, a “Scotland” dummy and the 
interaction of both. In the second column, we add to the set of regressors the logarithm of the 
capacity of the establishment interacted with the “After” dummy. In the third column, we 
include a full set of county dummies. Finally, in the fourth column, we focus on the sample of 
pubs that appears in both waves and we include a set of establishment fixed effects.  For 
brevity,  we  only  report  the  estimates  for  the  parameter  of  interest  (i.e.  the  estimated 
coefficient on the interaction between “After” and “Scotland”). 
The basic differences-in-differences specification in column (1) shows that sales fell 
in the short run by a statistically significant 9.7 percent in Scottish pubs relative to pubs in 
Northern England.  On the other hand, the estimated impact of the ban on prices shows there 
to  be  a  very  small  positive  but  statistically  insignificant  effect.    Including  controls  for 
establishment capacity (column (2)) and counties (column (3)) does not qualitatively affect 
these results.  
In our interviewing procedures we made a special effort in the phone survey to re-
interview those that appear in the first wave. As a consequence of that we have a group of 
917 establishments that appear in both waves (895 report information on prices and 381 on 
                                                 
15 The results in columns (1) and (4), for the outcomes sales and price of beer, are identical to those in Adda et 
al (2007) and are reproduced here only for presentational and comparative purposes.  
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sales). In column (4) of Table 2 we therefore include establishment fixed effects and estimate 
the short run effect of the ban for those pubs that appear in both waves. Reassuringly, the 
results are very similar to those reported in columns (1) to (3). In the short run, the smoking 
ban reduced sales by approximately 10 percent without there being any short run effect on 
beer prices.   
 We  study  medium  run  impacts  in  columns  (5)-(8)  by  examining  results  from 
statistical models based on data from the postal survey. The basic differences-in-differences 
model of column (5) shows a bigger (in absolute terms) medium run impact on total sales that 
fall by 29 percent as a consequence of the smoking ban. Adding controls for establishment 
capacity and counties reduces this estimate by around 6 percentage points, but the medium 
run impact on sales remains economically and statistically significant.  The sample of pubs 
that appear in both waves is relatively small in this case, at 185 establishments (180 report 
information on prices and 118 on sales). In column (8), where we condition on establishment 
fixed effects, we still find a medium run fall in sales of 11 percent but given the size of the 
standard  errors  –  two  times  bigger  than  in  the  phone  survey  -  we  cannot  reject  the  null 
hypothesis that the smoking ban has zero effect on sales at conventional levels of statistical 
significance.
16 Like in the short run, we find a precisely estimated zero effect of the smoking 
ban on the price of beer. 
We have pooled the balanced sample of pubs in the phone survey and postal surveys
17 
and estimated models for sales with fixed effects such as in columns (4) and (8). In a model 
where we impose a common effect, we find that the introduction of the smoking ban causes a 
                                                 
16 In this case there are only 24 clusters. 
17 Results available upon request from the authors.   15
fall  in  sales  of  10.8  percentage  points  (standard  error,  5.61)  with  a  p-value  of  0.062. 
Furthermore, if we allow the coefficients to differ between the short and medium run we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the medium run effects are at least as large as those in 
the short run. Therefore, this evidence seem to indicate that even after allowing pubs and 
individuals  to  adjust  to  the  new  reality  of  the  smoking  ban,  sales  continued  to  fall  as  a 
consequence of the smoking ban without a concomitant effect on prices of alcohol. 
Sales and Prices - Pubs With and Without Outdoor Spaces 
Smoking in outdoor spaces is not prohibited. In Table 3 we therefore study whether 
the effects of the smoking ban were different in establishments with and without outdoor 
space. We do so by interacting the treatment dummy with a variable that equals one if the 
establishment has outdoor space and zero otherwise. For brevity, we only report the most 
restrictive specifications. We condition on county dummies and establishment capacity and 
we introduce establishment fixed effects. Panel A of Table 3 shows the results for the phone 
survey and Panel B for the postal survey.  
In general the results reported in Table 3 show there to be significant heterogeneity in 
the effects of the smoking ban for those pubs with and without outdoor space. Sales falls both 
in the short and medium run in pubs without outdoor space. However, pubs with outdoor 
space tend to fare better than their counterparts. On the other hand, there does not seem to be 
heterogeneous effects on pricing behavior. A possible interpretation of these results is that 
where there is an outdoor space, either for comfort or climatic conditions, customers are able 
to enjoy a drink and smoke as well unlike in establishments without outdoor space. 
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Sales and Prices - Robustness of Results 
In our surveys there is a significant level of non-response, particularly for the sales 
questions,  and  we  need  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  this  on  our  results.  If  non-response  is 
correlated both with factors that affect these outcomes and with treatment status, then our 
estimates of the effect of the smoking ban are likely to be biased and inconsistent. In Table 4 
we therefore investigate whether having missing information for sales and/or for the price of 
beer is correlated with the “Scotland x After” interaction. For this purpose, we estimate the 
benchmark specification  (i.e., we condition on county dummies and capacity variables) using 
as a dependent variable an indicator that takes the value of one if an observation is missing 
for the relevant outcome and zero otherwise. In Panel A of Table 4 we report results for the 
phone survey and in Panel B for the postal survey. Reassuringly, the coefficients we estimate 
for  the  interaction  terms  are  small  in  magnitude  and  none  are  statistically  significant  at 
conventional levels. 
One  of  the  fundamental  assumptions  of  identification  with  a  differences-in-
differences  estimator  is  that  there  are  common  trends  between  the  treatment  and  control 
areas. In Table 5 we scrutinise this assumption by performing a placebo or ‘falsification’ 
experiment. To do so we take the data from the first wave of questionnaires (i.e., before the 
smoking ban) and we create a “placebo” dummy equal to one for those questionnaires that 
were send during the second four months of the sampling and zero for those send in the first 
four months. The interaction between the “placebo” dummy and “Scotland” should be zero if 
there are common trends. As in our benchmark specifications, we condition on the capacity 
of the pub interacted with the “placebo” dummy and county fixed effects. We look at two 
outcomes: total sales and price of beer. Encouragingly, the estimates are close to zero in   17
magnitude and none of them are statistically different than zero supporting our identification 
assumption. 
Profitability 
In the previous sub-sections we showed there to be a negative short and medium run 
impact on pub sales.  In the questionnaire, we also asked pub landlords: “In the past calendar 
month, what was your profit margin (pre-tax profits expressed as a percentage of sales)?”
 18 
Most landlords should be familiar with this measure of profitability. In Table 6 we present 
some descriptive statistics on the response to this question.  Not surprisingly it is clear that, in 
the short run, profit margins do not seem to change. However, in the medium run, profit 
margins increase in the English sample from 35.98 to 37.81 while they decrease in Scotland 
from 38.76 to 35.88. The smoking ban appears to have had a negative medium run effect on 
profit margins.  
In Table 7 we look at the impact of the Scottish ban on pub profit margins. In Panel 
A, where we look at the medium-run results, the estimates are remarkably similar across 
columns (1)-(3), ranging from a statistically significant fall of 4.413 to a fall in 4.565 points. 
The fall in the common sample, column (4), is around 1.686, but it is not statistically different 




                                                 
18  The respondents were given seven choices to answers this question: Less than 0%, 0% to 9%, 10% to 19%, 
20% to 29%, 30% to 39%, 40% to 49%, and 50% or more. Respectively, we assigned the following values to 
each answer:  0, 5, 15, 25, 35, 45 and 55. 
19 We can also reproduce the results from Table 3 where we find that in the long-run establishments with 
outdoor space are somewhat shield from the impact of the smoking ban. The analogous estimations of Table 4 
and 5 where we look at missing variables and the placebo experiment reveal that missing variables are not 
associated with treatment dummy and that the effect of the placebo treatment on profit margins is small and 
non-statistically significant. All these results are available upon request.   18
3.2 Event Study Analysis: Evidence from Stock Market Share Value 
The second angle we use to consider the impact on financial performance relies on an 
event study analysis of the reaction of the stock market performance of companies that own 
or operate public houses to news about the progress of anti-smoking legislation in England 
and  Scotland.  The  event  study  approach  is  widely  used  in  financial  economics  and  is 
predicated on the notion that, in an efficient stock market, a new piece of legislation that is 
expected to affect the stream of profits of a set of firms triggers a change in the price of these 
assets as soon as the legislative change is anticipated (see Schwert, 1981).  Market regulation 
is a clear candidate to have such an impact.   
The  asset  price  response  to  news  about  a  smoking-ban  depends  primarily  on  the 
underlying sensitivity of public houses profits to the smoking ban. The observed magnitude is 
mediated by two factors, the time pattern of the regulatory change and how much of this new 
information is already built-in to investors’ forecasts.  
We  therefore  identified  a  series  of  events,  beginning  in  2003,  which  could  have 
affected investors’ expectations about the likelihood and extent of a ban on smoking in public 
places.  In particular, we look for factors that could change the probability distribution of the 
realization of a legislative change. We then estimate the effect of the legislative change by 
comparing the return of a stock over an event window with respect to the return to the stock 
that we would have expected in the absence of the legislative change. The excess return to the 
stock measures the change in the stock price that can be attributed to the “news” about the 
legislative change. 
Following Schwert (1981), when a legislative change affects a set of companies at the 
same point in time, the common effect of the new regulation can be measured by analyzing   19




RP =  x R ∑ . Here Rit is the percentage change 
in the price of stock i from time t - 1 to t (i.e., the rate of return of stock i at time t), xit is as 
set of weights and RPt is the return of the portfolio of assets. If the portfolio of assets is 
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where RPt  is the return of the portfolio of assets at time t, RMt  is the return to the market 
index at time t, Dn  is a dummy variable equal to one on observation n and zero otherwise and 
there  is  one  dummy  for  each  observation  in  the  forecast  interval  and  t ε   is  a  normally 
distributed random specification error. 
  In this specification T0 is the event of interest and 1, …,T0 – 20 is a 100 trading days 
estimation window that starts 120 trading days prior to the event date (i.e., what in the jargon 
of event study analysis is called “estimation interval”). Finally T0-N, …, T0+N is a window of 
up to 5 trading days before and after the event date (i.e., what in the jargon of event study 
analysis is called “event window” or “forecast interval”). 
                                                 
20 This method produces results identical to the traditional method of estimating excess returns (see Karafiath, 
1988). An alternative way of estimating the excess returns is by using a dummy equal to one for the event 
window and then multiplying by the number of days in the event window.   20
The event day is defined as the day where the event happens or the next trading day 
for events that occur on week-ends and holidays. Because information related to the event 
could have been leaked or anticipated prior to the event, or the market being slow to affect 
the asset prices, we have also calculated longer event windows around the event date. All 
models include a set of day of the week dummies. The parameter of interest is 0 l , namely the 
cumulative excess returns over the event window. 
 Chronology of Events 
We have created a list of events related to the introduction of the smoking ban in 
England and Scotland searching for articles in the Financial Times that contained the words 
“SMOKING” and “BAN”. The events we report correspond to the window January 1, 2003 
to January 1, 2007. The search was carried using the service provided by LexisNexis. We 
have complemented this information in Scotland by searching for news in The Scotsman and 
Scotland on Sunday newspapers. Furthermore, we have also cross referenced the main events 
with information that appeared in the main UK newspapers and the BBC News.  
This venture identified a total of fifteen events that might have led the market to 
revise  their  expectations  about  the  likelihood  and  type  of  restrictions  on  smoking  to  be 
introduced  in  public  places.  The  events  range  from  the  release  of  official  government 
publications such as the Chief Medical Report to the voting outcomes of the Health Bill. 
There are in total five news events, two introductions of bills in parliament, four official 
publications, and four voting outcomes. These events are listed in Table 8 with further details 
about the chronology of events provided in Appendix 1. 
Data   21
In order to analyze the effect of the smoking ban on shareholder wealth, we collected 
stock market data for firms that trade in the main market of the London Stock Exchange. We 
focused  on  the  UK  Pubs  sector  during  the  period  2003-2006  and  in  the  following  six 
companies: Enterprise Inns, Greene King Plc, JD Wetherspoon Plc, Marstons Plc, Mitchells 
& Butlers Plc, and Punch Taverns Plc. These companies are consistently among the top five 
pub operators in the UK with, for example, revenues for 6500 million pounds and around 
24000 pubs in 2006 (British Hospitality Association (2008)).
21 
Daily stock return information for the companies and the market index (FTSE all 
shares index) were obtained from Datastream. We use the 'current' price on Datastream's 
equity programs that is the prices at the close of market each day adjusted for subsequent 
capital actions. 
Event Study – Results 
In Table 8 we present the results of the event study analysis for a value weighted 
portfolio of the six pub companies.
22 We look at each event over four windows: event day, 
event day plus the following 5 trading days, event day plus the previous 5 trading days, event 
day  plus  the  previous  and  following  5  trading  days.  Standard  errors  are  reported  in 
parentheses. 
The key legislative events (publication of the White Paper on Health Strategy, Vote of 
Smoking Ban in Scotland, introduction of the Health Bill, and Vote of the Health Bill in 
England) show a negative and statistically significant effect on cumulative excess returns 
over the event window. Some of these excess returns appear in the previous five days to the 
                                                 
21 The top five in 2006 were:  1. Punch Taverns (9240 pubs), 2. Enterprise Inn (8652 pubs), 3. Marston’s (2544 
pubs), 4. Greene King (1512 pubs), 5. Mitchell & Butlers (1389 pubs). JD Wetherspoon ranked in 10
th place 
with 646 pubs. The operators between places 6 and 9 did not quote in the London Stock Exchange.  
22 The results are similar if we use an equally weighted portfolio.    22
event, which indicate that the “news” has been leaked or anticipated by the market before the 
event. The largest effect we find is after the vote on the Scottish smoking ban. On the event 
day, there is of 2.4% fall in excess returns and the accumulated fall over the longer window is 
8.6%. On the vote of the health bill in England the fall over the longer window is of 3.9%.  
The other event where excess returns are negative is the publication of the 2003 Chief 
Annual Medical Report where over the longer window the index falls by 5.3%. In this report 
Sir Liam Donaldson, the Chief Medical Officer, makes his strongest case for the smoking ban 
by stating that the economic case against the ban was not an issue and that smoking should be 
banned from public places. There is only one event where the excess returns are positive and 
statistically  significant  at  the  5  percent  level  and  it  is  when  a  Member  of  the  Scottish 
Parliament introduces a private bill to ban smoking in restaurants in Scotland without the 
support from the Scottish executive. 
Finally, we test whether in each event window the cumulative returns are jointly equal 
to  zero.  In  order  to  perform  this  test  we  estimate  a  system  of  15  seemingly  unrelated 
regressions and we report a Wald test with 15 degrees of freedom in Table 8. We reject the 
null hypotheses in all cases. 
Robustness Checks 
The key in the analysis is that the events we present provided “new” information 
about the progress of the ban. We test the robustness of our findings using two strategies. 
First, in Table 9, we look at how the set of events leading to the smoking ban that affected the 
Belhaven Group. This company was founded in 1719 and acquired by Greene King in August 
2005 and has all its pubs (270 in 2004) in Scotland. As we can see, the progress of the 
Scottish smoking ban legislation negatively affected its stock market value. The news that,   23
after his visit to  Ireland, the Scottish First Minister will consider a ban on smoking was 
accompanied  by  a  fall  of  7.5%  over  the  longer  window.  The  announcement  of  the 
introduction of the smoking bill on November 10 lead to a 2.9% fall on the event day and 
negative excess returns of 6.3 % over the longer window. Finally, we divide the events as 
either affecting Scotland or England  and we carry  a Wald test of  whether in each  event 
window  the  cumulative  returns  are  jointly  equal  to  zero.  In  general  we  reject  the  null 
hypotheses that events in Scotland are jointly equal to zero but we cannot reject the null 
hypotheses that events in England do not affect the Belhaven group.  
As  a  further  robustness  check,  we  look  at  events  that  should  not  have  carry  new 
information and we will expect not to affect asset valuation. We have picked the day the 
smoking ban was introduced in Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England. We 
also look at the publication of the Chief Medical reports of 2004 and 2005 that carry no 
information about second hand smoking. We present the result of this analysis in Table 10. 
Over the longer window, four coefficients are negative and four are positive. None of these 
coefficients  are  statistically  significant  at  conventional  levels.  In  fact,  over  the  32  event 
windows there are only three coefficients (all in the same date and with different signs) that 
are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The Wald tests of whether these events are 
jointly equal to zero cannot reject the null hypothesis.   24
4.  Theory 
The Model 
We now set out a simple model where pubs compete by choosing amenity provision 
and prices. Our purpose in setting out this model is to consider welfare effects of government 
regulation in this context; in particular we examine whether a ban on smoking in pubs can be 
welfare improving, or some other regulation might be appropriate, such as licensing smoking 
pubs. 
Our model is intended to capture the following features. First, cigarette smoke has a 
large public good element, in the sense that if a pub permits customers to smoke, this can 
have an adverse effect on non smokers (or on smokers who have quit, who may be tempted to 
smoke again). Conversely, if a pub prohibits smoking, this has an adverse effect upon die-
hard  smokers,  who  have  no  desire  to  quit.  While  pubs  may  be  able  to  choose  a  mix  of 
smoking  and  non-smoking  rooms,  the  heart  of  the  problem  appears  to  be  the  fact  that 
facilities cannot be tailored so as to perfectly satisfy both types of consumer, so that the 
public good element remains.
23 We shall therefore simplify and adopt a binary specification, 
where each pub must choose either to permit smoking or to prohibit it – the main qualitative 
conclusions of the model also obtain in a more general specification. Second, consumers are 
heterogeneous in the valuation of this amenity. Non-smokers dislike cigarette smoke, and 
may  also  differ  in  the  intensity  of  their  preferences  in  this  dimension.  Smokers  prefer  a 
smoking pub, and here again, one can allow the intensity of smoking preferences to vary. 
Finally, we shall also allow for an element of horizontal differentiation, so that consumers 
                                                 
23This  could  be  due  to  the  cost  of  sub-dividing  rooms  finely,  and  also  due  to  random  variations  in  the 
proportions of smokers/non-smokers over time.     25
prefer  to  frequent  a  pub  that  is  located  "close"  to  them,  where  closeness  may  have  a 
geographical element but may also refer to other characteristics of the pub.  
More specifically, we adopt the Hotelling model of competition between two pubs 
located at the end- points of the unit interval. Let pub A be located at 0, and let pub B be 
located at 1, and let consumers be uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Consumers differ 
in two distinct dimensions: location and smoking preferences. First, any consumer incurs a 
“transport cost” t per unit distance travelled. Second, they differ in smoking preferences: 
some are smokers and get a positive benefit from being able to smoke in the pub, while non-
smokers incur a disutility from being exposed to tobacco smoke.  
We model smoking preferences as follows, let the set of types be indexed by the 
elements of the set {1, 2, ..., n} and {N,S} and ui  denote the additional benefit/harm that a 
consumer of type i gets from the pub being a smoking one. For a smoker, ui>0, while for a 
non-smoker, ui<0.
24 Types S is a die-hard smoker, and will only frequent a pub if he can 
smoke. Similarly, type N is a die-hard non-smoker, and will only frequent a non-smoking 
pub.  Types belonging to {1, 2, ..., n}  are responsive – i.e., they may be smokers or non-
smokers depending upon whether ui is positive or negative; however, the magnitude of ui  is 
small enough that they are willing to patronize a pub that chooses a policy that is different 
from their preferred one, provided that the price and locational advantage offset this.  
Let λi be the measure of consumers of type i. Abstracting from transport costs, such a 
consumer enjoys a payoff υ from patronizing a non smoking pub and a payoff of υ +ui from 
                                                 
24 One may also allow for a third type, "reformed smokers", who have quit but have a self-control problem. 
These would prefer a non-smoking pub, so as to be able to commit not to smoke. The ex-ante self of such a type 
would also have ui<0, although the ex-post self gets positive benefit from smoking. Our positive analysis 
applies to such types -- the interpretation being that the choice would be made on the value of ui for the ex-ante 
self rather than the ex-post self.   26
patronizing a smoking pub. Consumers have also an outside option, which can be interpreted 
as  staying  at  home,  with  payoff  of  w  for  non-smokers  and  of  w  +ui  for  smokers.  We 




= = ∑ , and we denote 
λS and λN the number of die-hard smokers and non-smokers in the population, respectively. 
Finally, we define θ and σ
2 as the mean and variance, respectively, of ui/t across responsive 
consumers. 
Our analysis can also be applied where the decision to go to the pub is taken by a 
group of individuals. As long as group decision making is efficient, in the sense that the 
choice between pubs is made to maximize the sum of individual utilities over the group, our 
analysis continues to apply.
25  
Our model is related to models of quality choice with horizontal differentiation and 
heterogeneous quality preferences such as Armstrong and Vickers (2001) or Rochet and Stole 
(2002).  These  oligopolistic  screening  models  allow  qualities  to  be  tailored  to  individual 
quality preferences. This is not possible in our context - the public good element implies that 
pubs must offer a single quality to all consumers. Anderson and Coate (2005) and Armstrong 
(2005)  study  the  market  provision  for  broadcasting,  where  the  public  good  element  also 
applies. Anderson and Coate focus on the incidence of advertising, which has a nuisance 
value to consumers. They assume that consumers have the same disutility from advertising.  
Armstrong allows broadcasters to choose program quality, and assumes that consumers have 
homogenous valuations for quality. He shows that if broadcasters can charge the appropriate 
prices, then quality provision is optimal. 
                                                 
25It is possible, of course, that group decision making is based on majority rule, in which case it would be 
inefficient, but this question is somewhat orthogonal to the concerns of this paper.   27
Suppose that both pubs permit smoking. They then compete by choosing prices. In 
this case, the pricing equilibrium is standard, and well known. Let us assume that marginal 
costs are zero. Both pubs will charge a price equal to t and serve half the consumers, i.e. the 
responsive  consumers  and  the  die-hard  smokers.  Profits  in  each  pub  will  therefore  be 
t(1+λS)/2.  Now suppose that both do not permit smoking, e.g. because smoking in pubs is 
banned by the government. The pubs now compete for the die-hard non-smokers and the 
responsive consumers. It can be verified that equilibrium prices are unaffected, and will equal 
t  and  profits  will  equal  t(1+λN)/2.  Thus,  the  demand  effect  depends  upon  the  relative 
proportions of die-hard smokers versus die-hard non-smokers. Given our empirical results 
about uniformity of smoking and the fall in sales it must be that there are more die hard 
smokers.  
We now consider the welfare implications of different policies towards smoking.  Our 
welfare criterion is utilitarian, i.e. it equals the sum of consumer and producer surpluses. 
Since marginal costs are normalized to zero, our calculations can be performed in terms of 
the total gross utility of each type of consumer. A consumer who frequents a pub that allows 
smoking enjoys a total utility of v+ui, minus the transport costs that she incurs and the price 
paid, where ui can be positive or negative depending on whether she is a smoker or not. If she 
frequents a pub that does not permit smoking, the term in ui is not present. A consumer who 
does not frequent her pub enjoys her outside option w, plus the maximum of 0 and ui, since 
she can choose to smoke or not, as she prefers.  
Note that our welfare calculations refer to the consumer’s own valuation ui; on the 
basis of which he or she makes a decision regarding which pub to patronize. This has two 
implications. First, this is clearly a non-paternalistic welfare evaluation. Second, this makes a   28
difference when there is a difference between the utilities of the ex-ante and ex-post selves of 
the consumer - our welfare calculation utilizes the utility of the ex-ante self, since it is this 
self that makes the decision regarding which pub to patronize. This is relevant when we 
consider potential smokers with a self control problem, since we are assigning weight to their 
preference for self control, rather than their desire to yield to temptation. 
Consider first welfare when both pubs permit smoking. In this case, the die-hard non-
smokers  will  stay  at  home,  and  enjoy  their  outside  option.  Since  prices  are  equal,  the 
responsive consumers and die hard smokers patronize whichever pub is closer. Their gross 
utility (and therefore welfare) equals 
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The first term is the sum of utility and profits from the responsive consumers. The second 
term  is  for  the  die-hard  smokers,  while  the  final  term  is  the  utility  of  the  die-hard  non-
smokers, from their outside option. 
On the other hand, when both pubs restrict smoking, the smokers will stay at home, and in 
this case, analogously, 
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A sufficient condition for the above expression to be positive is that the average utility of 
smoking among the responsive consumer is positive and that the number of die-hard smokers 
is larger than the die-hard non-smokers
26.  
Finally consider the case where pub A restricts smoking while pub B does not. One 
possibility is that the social planner dictates this outcome, and also imposes price regulation 
decreeing  that  both  pubs  charge  the  same  price,  in  which  case  consumers  will  allocate 
themselves to pubs in a welfare optimal way. In this case, if the price is low enough all types 
of consumers will go to a pub – the die-hard types will all frequent the pub which offers the 
option they prefer, while the responsive consumers will choose based both on their smoking 
preference (and its intensity) and their location. Welfare is given by 
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Examining  these  expressions,  we  see  that  a  mix  of  policies  is  welfare  superior 
provided that there is sufficient heterogeneity in smoking preferences, i.e. provided λS and λN 
are large, and provided the variance of smoking utilities, σ
2, is large relative to the mean, θ. 
We  therefore  conclude  that  this  form  of  regulation  will  be  optimal  if  there  is  sufficient 
heterogeneity of smoking preferences in the population. 
If  regulation  takes  the  form  of  dictating  diversity  in  amenity  provision  (e.g.  via 
licensing)  without  regulating  prices,  then  equilibrium  prices  will,  in  general,  be  different 
across the two pubs. In this case, the equilibrium allocation of consumers to pubs will not be 
optimal. However, it can be shown that in this case as well, welfare will be greater when the 
pubs choose heterogeneous policies than when they choose the same policy, provided that 
                                                 
26 We assume that all die-hard consumers are served if their type of pub is available (i.e., w≤υ-1.5t). Thus, υ-
0.25t>w   30
there is sufficient heterogeneity of smoking preferences in the population. Note that in this 
case,  heterogeneity  also  has  distributional  implications  –  prices  will  be  higher  and  in 
consequence, average pub profits will also be higher. 
Our analysis can also be applied to consider the preferences of workers regarding the 
smoking environment. Suppose that non-smokers suffer disutility from working in a smoking 
environment, while smokers do not mind (or prefer such an environment). Thus, non-smokers 
would  demand  a  compensating  differential  for  working  in  a  smoking  environment.  Here 
again, the optimal allocation would require diversity, with some pubs permitting smoking 
while others do not, whereas the equilibrium allocation implies uniformity of policies. 
 
5. Conclusion 
There is much public policy and media interest in smoking restrictions that have, in different 
forms and guises, been introduced in many countries. Indeed, the imposition of a ban on 
smoking in public places has often generated controversy and there are many advocates and 
opponents of such policies. The very fact that this subject is emotionally charged emphasizes 
the value of bringing together empirical evidence and thinking carefully about what economic 
theory has to say about such bans.  
We consider empirical evidence based on data we collected ourselves before and after 
the smoking ban that was introduced in Scotland in 2006.  We complement this with an event 
study analysis looking at the impact of smoking ban related announcements on the share 
prices of UK companies that own or operate public houses to news about the progress of anti-
smoking  legislation  in  England  and  Scotland.  The  evidence  we  present  shows  that  the 
smoking bans had a deleterious impact on firm performance. This works in both the short and   31
medium  run  through  reduced  sales,  which  then  damaged  medium  run  profitability,  and 
through affecting stock market valuations of companies. 
 As the theoretical model makes clear a comprehensive blanket ban on smoking in 
pubs may not be socially optimal, even though there is a case for government regulation to 
ensure that there are some non-smoking pubs. A better way to achieve this would be by 
permitting diversity (e.g. by auctioning licenses to pubs to permit smoking).  Indeed licensing 
smoking pubs may well have been a better policy route to have followed than the current 
blanket ban policies in operation in Scotland and England, both in terms of having a less 
damaging impact on the economic performance of pubs and upon consumer welfare, at least 
if the latter is evaluated in a non-paternalistic way.   32
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Appendix 1 
 
This Appendix gives more detail on the historical context of the introduction of the Scottish 
smoking ban in March 2006 and the English smoking ban in July 2007. The information 
provided here forms the basis for the events listed in Table 8. 
 
History of the Scottish Ban 
 
The formation of the Scottish Parliament and Executive to administer Scottish affairs in 1999 
allowed  Scotland  to  create  anti-tobacco  legislation  independently  of  the  rest  of  the  UK. 
Before 2004, however, the Executive view was that legislation to ban smoking in bars and 
restaurants  was  a  last  resort.  In  2000,  the  hospitality  industry  has  signed  up  a  Scottish 
Executive charter designed to encourage smoke-free policies, including better ventilation and 
prominently displayed official stickers outlining the establishment smoking policy. The idea 
was to rely on the voluntary approach as much as possible. 
 
The first indication that smoking could be banned in all pubs, restaurants and cafes came after 
the  Scottish  Chief  Medical  Officer,  Mac  Armstrong,  urged  ministers  to  take  a  tougher 
approach  on  anti-smoking  legislation.  In  a  statement  released  after  the  UK’s  2002  Chief 
Medical Annual Report he said: "I feel very strongly about this issue and I will be seeking to 
influence  as  many  people  as  possible  in  public  life,  including  the  Scottish  Executive,  to 
pursue  bold  actions  supporting  the  choice  of  non-smokers  to  breathe  clean  air  in  public 
places.” (Scotland on Sunday, July 6 2003). 
 
On January 14 2004 the Scottish Executive published its much awaited blueprint on tobacco, 
which aimed at creating a “smoke-free Scotland”.  The Tobacco Action Plan blueprint was in 
the form of a public consultation; while it included the option of a smoking ban, the First 
Minister,  Jack  McConnell,  and  his  ministerial  colleagues  emphasized  that  this  could  be 
impractical in the short term. This behavior was against what was perceived to be the view of 
the Executive (Scotsman, December 29, 2003). 
 
However, on February 5 2004 an MSP (Member of the Scottish Parliament) of the opposition 
SNP (Scottish National Party), Stewart Maxwell
27, unveiled a private member's bill which 
sought to ban smoking in areas where food was served. Representatives of the Executive 
refused to rule out support for the bill, but insisted ministers would first consult widely to 
gauge public support. The opinion of the First Minister at that time was against a blanket ban. 
 
On June 10 2004 the Scottish Executive started a consultation on a possible smoking ban. A 
source close to the Deputy Health Minister, Tom McCabe, who was steering the Executive's 
consultation on a possible smoking ban said: "Although he is waiting for the end of the 
                                                 
27 Maxwell’s bill was drawn from Kenny Gibson’s abandoned proposal after he lost his Glasgow seat in the 
May 2003 elections. The bill, which was proposed in 2001, attracted substantial cross-party support and was 
backed by health professionals.  
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consultation he is very much of the view that there should be a ban on smoking in pubs and 
restaurants." (Scotland on Sunday, July 4 2004).  
 
More  significantly,  following  a  visit  to  Ireland  at  the  beginning  of  September,  the  First 
Minister  announced:  "I  am  now  much  closer  to  the  idea  that  a  consistent  ban  could  be 
advantageous  and  would  make  such  a  law  much  easier  to  observe."  (The  Scotsman, 
September 1 2004).  However, the UK Westminster government told McConnell that he will 
have to go alone if he wanted to introduce a blanket ban on smoking.  
 
In fact, The Scotsman reports on November 2 2004 that the First Minister was facing fierce 
opposition from within his own cabinet over his proposal to introduce a ban on smoking in 
public  places.  Some  Ministers  were  understood  to  be  concerned  about  the  effect  that  a 
smoking ban would have on Labour's electoral prospects, particularly as John Reid, then the 
Health Secretary, had publicly questioned the wisdom of a blanket ban. 
 
In a bold move, however, the Executive announced
28 on November 10 2004 the introduction 
of a bill in the Scottish parliament to ban smoking in all public places. On April 28 2005 
MSPs voted by 83 to 15 in favor of a blanket smoking ban, with only the Conservatives 
opposing the move. After the vote, the legislation went back to the committee for further 
scrutiny but it was almost certain that the law would be passed.  
 
On June 30 2005 Scotland became the first part of the United Kingdom to ban smoking in 
public places when MSPs voted by an overwhelming majority to implement an all-out ban 
from Spring 2006. The ban started on March 26 2006. 
 
The English Smoking Ban 
 
The first strong public signal by someone appointed by the government in favor of a smoking 
ban in all public places in England came from the publication of the 2002 Chief Medical 
Annual Report.
29 Published on July 3 2003 the report prepared by the governments’ Chief 
Medical  Officer,  Sir  Liam  Donaldson,  highlighted  the  potential  dangers  of  second  hand 
smoking and made a number of recommendations for action. Chief among them was the 
introduction of a ban on smoking in public places in the near future.  
 
In reaction to the publication of this influential report the Department of Health said that it 
would give serious consideration to the proposal but that “would prefer to continue working 
with the industry to raise awareness and change behaviour.”  (Financial Times, July 4 2003). 
In fact, this was the government’s position for much of 2003. This view was also shared by 
the Tobacco and Hospitality industry which advocated continuing with a voluntary approach 
to regulation rather than using legislation. 
                                                 
28 In his speech the First Minister announced that the smoking legislation will be introduced in the Health 
Service (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill due to be presented to parliament before Christmas 2004. 
29 On May 10, 2003, Labour MP Gareth Thomas introduced a private member bill to secure a ban on smoking in 
cafes and restaurants.  The Smoking (Restaurants) Bill, which was not passed, prevented people from lighting 
up in any premises that sells food.   36
Representatives of the medical profession and other health practitioners were unhappy with 
the  Government  position.  On  November  25  2003,  a  public  letter  endorsed  by  the  Royal 
College  of  Physicians  and  17  other  medical  colleges  appeared  in  The  Times  newspaper 
calling  for  a  ban  on  smoking  in  public  places.  The  letter  warned  that  there  was  now 
compelling evidence about the dangers of passive smoking and argued that the system of 
voluntary self-regulation in bars and restaurants had failed.  
 
Once again the Department of Health reiterated its backing of the system then in place and 
said that the Government had no plans to introduce a ban. However, a consultation exercise 
launched by Labour’s party only a few days later asked whether Local Authorities should be 
able to introduce smoking bans at work and in public places. 
 
The  year  2004  saw  a  clear  move  towards  the  idea  of  introducing  legislation  that  would 
restrict smoking in public places. For example, the Financial Times of July 26 2004 reported 
a  meeting  held  by  John  Reid  (the  Health  Secretary)  with  publicans  and  restaurateurs  to 
discuss plans to ban smoking gradually in all public places. Several options were considered, 
but  both  pub  operators  and  anti-smoking  groups  were  against  the  idea  of  devolving  the 
decision on smoking bans to Local Authorities. At that time, the government and business 
were believed to be moving towards the idea of a gradual ban on smoking. 
 
The  publication  of  the  2003  Chief  Medical  Annual  Report  on  July  28  2004  marked  the 
strongest support yet from Sir Liam Donaldson to the introduction of a smoking ban. The 
report, titled: “Going Smoke Free: The Economic Case”, pointed out that there was currently 
no evidence that smoking bans in other countries have damaged the profits of hospitality 
companies and that actually the number of customers had risen after a ban was introduced. 
The  report  recommended  that:  “Smoke-free  workplaces  and  smoke-free  enclosed  public 
places should be created as a priority through legislation.” 
 
In the run up to the publication of the White Paper on Public Health Strategy that would 
provide, among other issues, a strategy on anti-smoking regulation the government felt that 
there was no public support for extending a ban to pubs (Financial Times, 29 September 
2004). In fact, the Health Secretary appeared as the cabinet's leading liberal on lifestyle issues 
and suggested that anti-tobacco campaigners were patronizing working class smokers.  
 
Towards the end of September the idea of introducing targeted restrictions on smoking in 
public places received increased media attention. On November 16 2004 the government 
published the much awaited White Paper. The document offered a set of national restrictions 
that ban smoking in all restaurants that provide hot food. Thus, it decided against allowing 
pubs, restaurants and offices to apply to their Local Authorities for licenses that would allow 
smoking. 
 
The position of the government seemed to please no one. The document was received bitterly 
by the Chief Medical Officer and anti-tobacco groups because it failed to provide a blanket 
ban on smoking in public places. ‘The British Beer and Pub Association also attacked the 
plans - calling the distinction "artificial" and "arbitrary" - and saying that it seemed "designed   37
to drive pubs back to the days when they were drinking dens".’ (Financial Times, November 
17 2004) 
 
In spite of these criticisms the idea of a ban was introduced in Labour’s election manifesto 
prior to the 2005 general election and a tortuous and uncertain road to the Public Health Bill 
of October 27 2005, started when the Labour party was elected for a third consecutive period 
on May 5 2005.  
 
The Prime Minister reshuffled the cabinet after the General Election. Patricia Hewitt became 
Health Secretary and John Reid moved to Defense. On June 19 2005 Hewitt signalled that 
she  wanted  to  take  a  tougher  stance  on  the  smoking  regulation  than  her  predecessor. 
Although Department of Health officials repeatedly denied plans to outlaw smoking in public 
places  completely,  they  indicated  they  could  change  their  mind  if  a  public  consultation 
revealed support for this policy. 
 
But  on  October  10  2005  -  16  days  before  the  Public  Health  Bill  was  due  -  the  Health 
Secretary  got  approval  from  the  Prime  Minister  to  push  for  a  tougher  approach.  Patricia 
Hewitt proposed an outright ban or sealed off rooms in pubs for smokers. The cabinet was 
much divided over this issue. The bill was due on October 26, but ministers failed to agree on 
a possible compromise to allow dedicated smoking rooms in pubs and clubs.  
 
In the end, to the embarrassment of the Health Secretary and the Prime Minister, the Public 
Health Bill proposed to parliament on October 27 2005, returned to the original formula used 
in the  Labour manifesto that allowed smoking in pubs and bars that did not serve food. 
Although the industry saw the original formula difficult to implement it was relieved by the 
fact  that  private  club  operators  will  not  be  allowed  special  dispensations.  Some  MPs, 
particularly those in the Commons Health Committee, were outraged by the decision of not 
proposing an outright ban.  
 
On January 10 2006 a group of backbenchers, led by Mr Barron, tabled an amendment to the 
Health Bill demanding no exemptions to a ban. The next day the Prime Minister agreed to 
give Labour MPs a free vote on this particular point which made a total ban on smoking in 
pubs and clubs in England more likely but not inevitable. Although the Liberal Democrats 
backed a total ban, the Conservatives were also offered a free vote. 
 
After a heated debate which exposed the differences in government on this issue, on February 
14  2006  MPs  voted  by  384  to  184  for  an  outright  smoking  ban.  The  ban  was  finally 
introduced in England on July 1 2007.  
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c
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c
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c
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